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The hypothesis is advanced that testing and evaluation
(T&E) of complex weapons systems requires unique skills, that
the testing and evaluation of weapons systems has evolved
into a recognizable engineering discipline, and that pro-
fessional technical personnel in the Department of Defense
Test and Evaluation community should be considered as unique
assets and supported by the establishment of a postgraduate
curriculum in T&E engineering.
The evolution of DOD T&E is traced and analyzed with
particular attention to capability requirements of personnel.
The general conclusion is reached that the hypothesis can
not now be universally supported. Reasons for this position
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Test and Evaluation (T&E) is conducted to support the
acquisition of weapon systems by the Department of Defense
(DOD) . These weapon systems integrate the latest advances
in technology and are complex. T&E field activity personnel
have suggested that advanced education is required to support
the T&E of modern weapon systems. It is also believed that
T&E is evolving as an engineering discipline/ and a graduate
level curriculum in T&E engineering should be established.
B. OBJECTIVES
The objectives of this study are to:
1. Show that T&E is an important element of the weapon
systems acquisition cycle and should be recognized as a
discipline which is unique to DOD.
2. Determine if there is a need for T&E postgraduate
education and if it should be institutionalized in the DOD.
3. Propose a model for T&E postgraduate education for
military and civilian personnel.
C. HYPOTHESIS
The T&E of complex weapon systems and sub-systems requires
unique skills to understand, design, conduct, evaluate, and
report test results. The T&E of weapon systems in support of

the DOD acquisition cycle has evolved into a recognizable
engineering discipline. The professional technical personnel
in the DOD T&E community should be considered as unique
assets and should be supported by establishing a postgraduate
curriculum in T&E engineering.
D. SCOPE
This research considered the evolution of T&E in the DOD
in the 1970 's to the beginning of the 1980 's. The T&E of air-
craft weapon systems in the Department of the Navy (DON) was
used as the primary means for illustrating the objectives of
this research. If a contiuum of need (from minimum to maximum)
for T&E postgraduate education was applicable, the T&E of
aircraft weapon systems would fall in the maximum need posi-
tion of this scale. This constraint does not detract from the
universality of the results to the role of T&E in support of
other types of weapon systems acquisition in the DOD. Although
each of the Services does not face exactly the same conditions
in acquisitions of weapons systems, the tasks and problems of
T&E are similar. Departments of the Army and the Air Force
T&E perspectives were used when appropriate to this study.
E. METHODOLOGY
The approach used to prepare this study was threefold.
The author relied heavily on 15 years of experience in the
T&E of aircraft weapon systems. An archival search was con-
ducted for references relative to this study. Interviews
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were held with Naval Postgraduate School faculty, high level
DOD officials, and T&E field activity personnel.
F. REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE
Two previous Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) theses [Refs.
1,2] deal with the T&E of Navy aircraft weapon systems and
are related to this study topic.
In reference 1, LCDR Bowes evaluated the Navy T&E process
for aircraft weapon systems, identified deficiencies and good
features of this process, and proposed a reorganization of the
Navy's T&E organizational structure. One of his conclusions
was the need for a course of instruction in the discipline of
weapon system T&E. In addition he recommended that a Systems
T&E Training School should be established at each of the major
test centers resulting from reorganization of the Navy's T&E
activities. This thesis presents the first documented need
for formal Navy T&E education.
In reference 2, LCDR Stoll examined the tasks assigned to,
the level of knowledge and experience of, and the need for
formal education of project officers at aviation T&E activities
He proposed a T&E education syllabus and alternatives for
achieving it based on the results of a survey of 78 project
officers located at development and operational aviation T&E
activities. Seventy-three officers were then attached to the




He reviewed test reports from the test activities to
determine the areas of knowledge and compared these with areas
of knowledge obtained from interviews and questionnaires.
Three out of four officers had received inadequate or no formal
training in the pertinent subject areas. One out of two
project officers, in their first year of experience, indicated
that their lack of T&E knowledge reduced their effectiveness
to do their jobs. As a result of the interviews and question-
naires, the pertinent subject areas were reduced from 61 to
49. These results substantiated the need for formal T&E
education.
LCDR Stoll designed a syllabus consisting of 10 courses
and 110 instructor contact hours. Six alternatives were pro-
posed. The alternatives range from a four to six quarter in-
residence T&E curriculum at the NPS (least favored by the
project officers, since they would rather be flying) to local
programs conducted by the test activities. He concluded that
one approach would not satisfy the need for formal T&E educa-
tion, consequently, a combination of methods was the recommend-
ed approach. An idealized approach was presented which con-
sidered eventual implementation of all the proposed alterna-
tives as a solution to this dilemma.
Since these theses were completed, the Naval Air Test
Center was reorganized and the Naval Air Systems Command
established an AIR-06 T&E Coordinator Division. It's mission
is to coordinate and manage the Naval Air Systems Command
12

T&E resources which include the field activities and the
major test ranges. In addition, the T&E Coordinator integrates
the operational T&E command test requirements into the Test
and Evaluation Master Plan for aircraft weapon systems. The
theses do not address the education requirements of the
civilian T&E population which is a major portion of the T&E
community.
Reference 3 is related in several ways to this study.
Dr. Matthews provides a compilation of T&E related material
which he prepared to focus attention on the evolving nature
of T&E. He advocates the recognition of T&E as an engineering
discipline. From his viewpoint T&E in the DOD is an extension
of basic scientific and engineering disciplines. One of his
observations was that there is a need for formal T&E education
and he proposed several alternatives for implementing it. The
emphasis of this document is toward providing a reference
source for background information on T&E in the DOD and an
aid to promoting T&E as an engineering discipline.
G. DEFINITIONS
Each of the Services over the years has introduced ter-
minology pertaining specifically to its efforts in T&E. The
Joint Logistics Commanders (consists of Commander U. S. Army
Materiel Development and Readiness Command, Commander Air
Force Logistics Command, Commander Air Force Systems Command,
and Chief of Naval Material Command) was formed to promote
13

cooperation in joint service acquisition programs. An ad
hoc group on T&E planning guidance published the Compendium
of Test Terminology [Ref. 4]. This document provides a use-
ful working level reference to avoid confusion when the same
term is used by each Service. The following definitions
define the three types of T&E most frequently referred to and
defined in reference 5.
1
.
Development Test and Evaluation (DT&E)
DT&E is that T&E conducted to assist the engineering
design and development process and to verify attainment of
technical performance specifications and objectives. DT&E is
usually accomplished or managed by the DOD Component's material
agency. It includes T&E components, subsystems, hardware/
software integration, related software, and prototype or full-
scale engineering development models of the system. T&E of
compatibility and interoperability with existing or planned
equipment and systems are also included.
2. Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E)
OT&E is that T&E conducted to estimate a system's
operational effectiveness and operational suitability, identify
needed modifications, and provide information on tactics,
doctrine, organization, and personnel requirements. Acquisition
programs shall be structured so that OT&E begins as early as
possible in the development cycle. Initial Operational Test
and Evaluation (lOT&E) must be accomplished prior to the




3. Production Acceptance Test and Evaluation (PAT&E)
PAT&E is T&E of production items to demonstrate that
procured items fulfill the requirements and specifications of
the procuring contract or agreements. Each DOD Component is





The weapon system acquisition policies of the DOD in the
late 1960 's received a lot of public attention. DOD had earned
a reputation for cost growth, schedule delays, and production
of systems before they were ready. This increased visibility
of DOD's perceived mismanagement of the defense tax dollar
resulted in a study of the entire organization, structure and
operation of DOD [Ref . 6] . A part of this study was a review
of the role of Test and Evaluation (T&E) in the acquisition of
weapon systems. A conclusion of the study was:
"Operational test and evaluation has been too infrequent,
poorly designed and executed, and generally inadequate."
[Ref. 6:2]
To focus additional attention on test and evaluation the study
recommended a Defense Test Agency which would oversee all
Defense T&E. Specifically it would design or review the
designs for tests; monitor the entire Defense test program;
and conduct T&E of systems which can be used across Services.
Also, the Panel recommended that a separate funding category
should be identified for T&E and operational testing. The
Defense Test Agency would have responsibility for this
funding.
Deputy Secretary of Defense, David Packard, was instru-
mental in implementing recommendations of the Blue Ribbon
16

Defense Panel which have affected T&E. He established the
Director of Defense T&E and moved the Services to establish
independent test agencies which report to the Service Chiefs
[Ref . 7] . Additionally, he increased the role of OT&E results
in the acquisition process by issuing DOD Directive 5000.1
[Ref. 8] requiring that OT&E be conducted before a decision
is made on full scale production. Congress also gave momentum
to the changing role of OT&E by passing a law which requires
that DOD give Congress, annually, the results of OT&E with
its request for funds on systems it is planning to procure
[Ref. 9]. The DOD Directive 5000.3, Test and Evaluation
[Ref. 7] , was issued to define policy on the types of testing
and the roles of the Services in T&E. This directive also
established the requirement for a Test and Evaluation Master
Plan (TEMP) which coordinates all the testing requirements
for a given program.
The Defense Science Board Task Force on T&E was formed in
late 1972. It was tasked to study a group of major weapon
systems to determine whether improvement in T&E would permit
earlier discovery of problems and initiation of corrective
actions. Its report [Ref. 10] in early 1974 identified that
improvements were needed in test planning and scheduling. T&E
participation was frequently deleted due to overruns of time
and money in other phases of the program. The Panel described
a T&E gap which occurred when testing pre-production hardware
or prototypes. Since the decision to start production cannot
17

occur until after initial OT&E (lOT&E) is completed, a
substantial lag (1.5 to 2 years) exists between completion
of development testing and manufacture of the first produc-
tion article. The Panel also provided nine related reports
which provide T&E guidelines for different types of systems,
for example, for missile weapon systems and for aircraft
systems.
The Office of Management and Budget published 0MB Circular
A-109 in 1976 which outlined the government's policy on the
acquisition of major systems [Ref. 11]. This circular was
issued to curb cost overruns and ensure the new systems are
needed. As a result of the issuance of this circular the DOD
and Service directives and instructions had to be revised. No
major changes in T&E policy were generated except for the
reemphasis of the requirement for T&E criteria. This included
the concept of independent testing and testing in the opera-
tional environment prior to approval for full production.
The lengthening of the acquisition cycle was studied by
a Task Force of the Defense Science Board and reported in 197 8
[Ref. 12] . It concluded that sequential and separate testing
of the systems by the test activities of the developer and the
independent test activities representing the user often adds
unnecessary costs and time. Thus the Tas]<: Force recommended
conducting combined development and operational tests wherever
feasible and separate evaluations of the data. The Task Force
expressed concern that independent test activities with their

increased influence would demand duplicate facilities and
increased testing. What is really desireable is combined
within the same service) testing and independent evaluation.
AlsO/ it was felt that the T&E activities should participate
throughout the entire acquisition cycle.
B . ENVIRONMENT
Presently, two major Navy aircraft weapon systems are in
full scale development testing at the Naval Air Test Center,
Patuxent River, Maryland. The F-18 program is employing the
single-site test concept. The contractor performs its develop-
ment and operational testing at this government facility with
Navy test activities monitoring the contractor's tests. At
specified times each of the Navy's test activities conduct
testing and perform independent evaluations of the data.
This approach has numerous advantages and disadvantages which
have not been fully assessed.
The second major aircraft weapon system in full scale
development testing at the Naval Air Test Center is the Light
Airborne Multi-Purpose System (LAMPS) MK-III. The LAMPS
MK-III helicopter and airborne systems are an extension of the
ship's Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) capability. In the case
of the LAMPS MK-III the Naval Air Test Center is not a single
site test location. It functions as the focal point for all
the Navy field activities' participation in the testing of
the complete LAMPS MK-III weapon system (includes aircraft and
19

ship systems) . The responsible operational test activity is
participating in combined testing with the developer's test
activities to reduce duplication, time, and costs of testing.
The operational test activity still retains designated test
periods for Initial OT&E (lOT&E) and Follow-on OT&E (FOT&E)
.
The Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP) was utilized as a
major management tool in working out the participation of the
T&E activities in this program. The flow f instructions
which govern the preparation of the TEMP is shown in Appendix
A, Figure 1.
The TScE participation in the minor acquisition programs
normally does not fare very well. It is estimated that
minor acquisition programs amount to three times the major
programs. The management, however, of these programs is not
normally provided with sufficient resources or experience to
manage the acquisition until it runs into trouble. The
Services have initiated the same acquisition procedures for
minor programs as for major programs with lower level review
and approval requirements. Consequently, the preparation of
a TEMP to coordinate the TSeE effort is an exception rather
than a rule. Few, if any program management offices, have
personnel experienced in T&E. The TEMP is a useful test
coordinating document, because, it brings the players together
to negotiate their requirements. It must be remembered,
however, that the acquisition cycle is dynamic, and the TEMP
is a point-in- time document. The program office must therefore
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become innovative in its effort to communicate changes in
the TEJyiP to all the participating activities.
C . TECHNOLOGY
The major and minor acquisition programs normally incor-
porate the latest technological advances. American industry
is the world leader in developing new technology and in
bringing it to the market place. High technology is driving
the economy while all segments of industry scramble to apply
it to increase productivity and drive down production costs.
This same pyschology exists in the acquisition of weapon
systems.
The T&E community personnel are dealing with increasingly
sophisticated and complex equipment and systems. The use of
airborne computers and associated software have found applica-
tion in on-board processing of information and analysis of
acoustical data in ASW missions, navigation, weapons delivery
control, communication, etc. . Rapid advances in semi-conductor
devices continues at a rapid rate. Functions which previously
could not be accomplished because of the size of the resulting
hardware are now being incorporated into airborne platforms.
Flight-control systems are now built around airborne computers
vice mechanical linkages. How the aircraft flies is a function




Airborne Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence
3(C I) functions are performed airborne as well as on the
ground. Achievement in this area has leaped forward with the
incorporation of semi-conductor advances into airborne radar
and communications devices. Likewise the electronic warfare
capabilities to detect, jam, or fool the agressor have all been
enhanced by the incorporation of semi-conductor technology.
Material technological advances in ceramics, composite
and metal compounds are being used in airframes to increase
strength to-weight-ratios, reduce detectability, and to
increase reliability and maintainability. Technological
advances in ceramics and metal compounds, producing higher
temperature resistant materials, are being applied to propul-
sive devices. As a result, jet engines are producing higher
thrust-to-weight ratios and are more energy efficient.
The technology list that the T&E community must deal with
is lengthy. The T&E of these high-technology systems presents
unique testing challenges. The challenge facing the T&E
community is to stay technically competent to do effective
testing in the face of fixed personnel ceilings and increasing
workload.
D. ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE
The Secretary of Defense (SOD) established the Director
of Defense for Test and Evaluation (DDT&E) . The DDT&E was
designated to report through the Under Secretary of Defense
22

for Research and Engineering. The DDT&E was identified as
having responsibility for monitoring and advising the SOD on
T&E conducted by the Services. It also provides access to
the office of the SOD for the Services' OT&E activities on
matters concerning independent testing. It is unlikely that
the military OT&E activities would use this access without
going through their normal command structures first. The
DDT&E organizationally is also the focal point for joint
service testing programs.
The organizational changes which resulted from the increased
emphasis on OT&E had the least impact on the Navy. The Navy
already had the Operational Test and Evaluation Force (OPTEVFOR)
in being. Therefore, it was able to comply rapidly to Deputy
Secretary of Defense Packard's request for the Services to set-
up independent operational testing agencies. The Navy establish-
ed a Director of RDT&E, OP-98, with the Commander of OPTEVFOR,
OP-98 3, reporting to the Navy Director of RDT&E. This
organizational change was the Navy's compliance for the
operational test activity to report to the Service Chief
independently of the developing agency.
The Naval Air Systems Command organizational structure was
amended in 1975. An Assistant Commander for Test and Evaluation
Coordination was established [Ref. 13]. This organization had
existed previously at a lower organizational level and was
tasked with allocating the Navy's RDT&E aircraft resources.
This organizational change was partially attributed to the
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findings of the Donaldson Committee Report on the T&E base
study, conducted for the Commander Naval Air Systems Command
[Ref. 14], A similar type of organization for TSeE coordina-
tion is not used by the other Services.
The Army and the Air Force required several years, until
the mid 1970 's to comply. The Army established the Operational
Test and Evaluation Agency (OTEA) and the Air Force set up the
Air Force Test and Evaluation Center (AFTEC) . The Commander
of OTEA reports to the Army Chief of Staff and the Commander
of AFTEC reports to the Chief of Staff Air Force. Both OTEA
and AFTEC have small headquarters' staffs which are dependent
on the operating commands to provide the manpower resources
to support OT&E. The Army and Air Force started out emphasiz-
ing combined testing in order to reduce costs and to use pre-
production resources more efficiently.
E . PLAYERS
1 . Program Manager
The program manager is the hub of the acquisition
cycle and the key to the level of T&E participation. He must
budget and plan for this participation and provide for any
special resources such as facilities which could involve
military construction funding. Normally the program manager
changes many times during major weapon system acquisitions.
Since it takes from 12 to 15 years from concept initiation to
initial operational capability, it is not unusual for a program
to have five program managers.
24

The program managers seldom have previous T&E experience
and it is easy for an adversary relationship to develop between
the program manager and the test community. He frequently does
not understand the functions of the Major Ranges or the Test
Centers and how to use them to support the development effort
or reduce engineering risk. The test activities by reporting
what is wrong with the system increase the program office
workload to explain away the problems or to plan for funding
and schedule changes to correct the deficiencies.
The military specifications and policy instructions
which are part of most weapon system contracts have built-in
test requirements which often come as a surprise to the
inexperienced program manager. Viewing T&E from the program
manager's perspective, his main objective is to get the OT&E
activity to grant a Provisional Acceptance for Service Use
(PASU) or an Acceptance for Service (ASU) which is the more
desireable. In the real world of politics, funding availability,
and schedule crunches the tendency is to make decisions favor-
ing OT&E requirements at the expense of DT&E requirements.
Program managers for minor programs are normally even
less prepared than the managers of major programs. Even
though the minor programs account for approximately three times
the funding of major acquisition programs, the program manager
is frequently a technical type who has not developed the
management and technical competencies to conduct a minor
acquisition. He must write the technical requirement portion
25

of the Request for Proposal, evaluate proposals, write the
work statement, provide technical direction to the development
effort, write test requirements, plan the conduct of the
engineering development tests, and provide guidance to higher
management. The minor program manager historically is compet-
ing with the major programs for funds inadequate to support
the procurement of all the items in deveopment. Testing
appears as an expensive item in a limited funding situation
or in an inadequately planned program and is usually among the
first items to be compromised. Minor programs, due to lower
visibility, are even more susceptible to frequent program
manager turnover. One of the findings of a GAO report con-
ducted on the Defense System Acquisition Review Council (DSARC)
was a relatively rapid turnover of high ranking DOD and Service
personnel responsible for the integrity of the DSARC process
[Ref . 15] . High ranking DOD civilians and military personnel
were changed at an average of 28 months and 24 months respec-
tively. This data certainly reflects unfavorably on the
management of the acquisition cycle and is relatively representa-
tive of program manager turnover. Unless the T&E program is
documented in a TEMP in the early phases of the acquisition
cycle, T&E is always vulnerable to inadequate funding and
support.
2. DT&E Testers
The contractor for the weapon system conducts testing
during the acquisition to support engineering development
26

efforts. The government personnel employed by the Major
Ranges and Test Facility Base (MRTFB) are primarily respon-
sible for conducting the government's technical testing during
the full scale development and production phases of the
acquisition cycle (Appendix A, Figure 2). The developer's
test activities also participate in the earlier phases of the
acquisition cycle but at a lesser degree than laboratory or
development center personnel. A listing of MRTFB and other
activities involved in T&E are listed in Appendix A.
It is difficult to determine the exact number of
government personnel employed in T&E. The civilian ceilings
have declined some in recent years, however, with an increas-
ing work load the test activities have turned to contracting
to operate test ranges and for some engineering support.
Collectively the DOD RDT&E community totals in excess of
100,000 personnel [Ref. 16]. The DDT&E estimates that approx-
imately 50,000 military, civilian, and contracted for personnel
operate the MRTFB and provide special test support. These
figures do not include OT&E personnel such as those assigned
to COMOPTEVFOR and the operating forces assigned temporarily
to the Army and Air Force operational test activities.
The MRTFB is staffed with both military and civilian
engineers and scientists. It is estimated that they will
spend $1.1 billion in FY 1981 [Ref. 17] not including the use
of Operating and Maintenance (O&M) funds — O&M funds support
the weapon system once it is in production to the end of its
27

life cycle — to conduct T&E of weapon systems. In terms of
government personnel and funds T&E is big business.
The DT&E community in the past has had difficulty in
obtaining engineering and scientific personnel due to a
combination of factors. A declining number of graduates in
engineering and the sciences, remote locations of the DT&E
activities, reduced personnel ceilings, hiring freezes which
frustrate recruiting efforts, and starting salaries substant-
ially below industry entry levels have summed to weaken the
DT&E technical base. Military personnel, specifically Navy,
with previous T&E experience are less likely to return for a
second tour of the DT&E activities due to a lack of a defined
career path in T&E. This is especially true in the DT&E of
Navy aircraft weapon systems. Costly and extensive training
is provided to naval flight officers to develop engineering
test pilot skills. In turn these officers serve an approximately
two-year tour before moving on to an assignment unrelated to
their T&E skills.
DT&E skills are mostly learned by on-the-job training
(OJT) . Each of the DT&E activities have established the
methodologies and techniques, instrumentation, and facilities
to acquire hard data to make assessments of engineering develop-
ment and risk. Most of the DT&E activities are in remote
areas and are limited markets for advanced technical education.
This has constrained the access of the DT&E personnel to
28

advanced technical education needed to renew their engineering
skills to challenge the complexity of modern weapon systems.
The Navy DT&E of aircraft weapon systems uses skilled
military operator personnel. Even though DT&E is conducted
under more controlled conditions than operational testing,
military test personnel are qualified to relate test results
to expected performance under fleet operating conditions.
The DTScE results are reported to the development agency and
OT&E personnel are encouraged to use DT&E results where feasible,
Also, DT&E personnel are required to support OT&E. In contrast
OT&E results are reported to the Chief of Naval Operations
level and are not normally available to DT&E personnel. The
reporting of weapon system deficiencies by DT&E personnel are
not necessarily reported in the same form as by OT&E personnel.
3. OT&E Testers
T&E is a team effort consisting of the program manager,
the development test activities and the operational test
agencies. Most of the focus, however, in the 1970 's has been
on an increase of the role of operational testing. The
acquisition policy has been changed to include participation
of OT&E personnel throughout the acquisition cycle. The
Services have used different approaches to meet the increased
responsibilities of OT&E. The Navy has its operational test
agency headquarters in Norfolk, Virginia. It has staffs on
the East and West Coast, three operational aircraft squadrons
(based on type of aircraft and mission) , and detachments —
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as required to support new tactics, operating procedures, and
techniques. The Army's operational test agency is located at
Falls Church, Virginia and the Air Force operational test
center is located at Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico. The
Air Force and Army staffs are small in comparison with the
Navy (less than 100 personnel vice more than 14 00 for the
Navy). None of the Service OT&E agencies employ many civilians,
therefore, continuity in the lengthly acquisition cycle is
difficult to maintain unless military reassignments are made
less frequently. The Navy does not provide for extended tours
for military personnel assigned to OPTEVFOR. In fact this
would be contrary to the policy stated by COMOPTEVFOR [Ref . 18]
.
This memo expresses the importance of having skilled operators
with recent "blue water" experience vice highly trained
technical operators to conduct operational testing. The Navy
OT&E concept was used by the Blue Ribbon Panel as an example
for the other Services to consider. The Navy OT&E was faulted
for its inability to produce "hard numbers" to assist high
level decision making. The COMOPTEVFOR has employed a few
civilian analysts to improve on this situation.
The GAO in 197 7 began a review of the Service OT&E
efforts. The Navy, having the most experience with an OT&E
organization, was reviewed first [Ref. 19] . GAO found the
Navy was still making production decisions with incomplete
OT&E results. OT&E could not be conducted on some systems due
to a lack of test resources, and OT&E conducted on systems,
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after production approval was granted, found performance
problems that should have been corrected before production
approval.
OT&E agencies feel they are the only test activities
which test the complete weapon system. OPTEVFOR views are
expressed on this position in the Operational Test Director
Guide [Ref . 20] . This manual also raises an interesting point
on the OPTEVFOR philosophy on the availability of operational
test data:
"In some programs it may be convenient (or absolutely
necessary) to use DA field agencies to get OT&E data
reduced and, to some degree, analyzed. In these situa-
tions it is mandatory that these people be under the
operational control of COMOPTEVFOR (represented by the
OTC/OTD/Program Analyst) while they are working on OT&E
data. Their work is defined in advance, and their results
are furnished only to COMOPTEVFOR, unless COMOPTEVFOR
has specifically approved a wider distribution." [Ref. 20:
16-2)
Field agencies are required to provide all information to
OT&E personnel and it could be implied from the above that the
exchange of data is in one direction only.
Although COMOPTEVFOR' s earlier position was to shun
the use of operator personnel with technical backgrounds, the
extreme pressures to make production decisions using "hard
data" has weakened this position. In the OT&E of aircraft
weapon systems there is trend toward OPTEVFOR project personnel
having technical backgrounds. This has the potential to
change the OT&E viewpoint toward acquiring more hard data to
substantiate OT&E results; and it raises issues on duplication
between OT&E and the developing agency's test activities.
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The Air Force and the Army have approached OT&E
differently than the Navy. They have emphasized combined
test activities of the developmental and operational testers,
the sharing of limited pre-production resources, and the use
of highly skilled operational testers. The GAO has critisized
their policies on OT&E [Refs. 21,22], In particular, both
Services needed to conduct operational testing in environments
more representative of the operational environment. Also, the
Services should designate distinct periods for operational
testing and provide the necessary test resources. The test
personnel and support should be more representative of the
type used when the system is deployed.
4. Board of Inspection and Survey and AIR-06
Two agencies which are unique to the Navy are the
Board of Inspection and Survey (BIS) and the Naval Air Systems
Command (AIR-06) , the Assistant Commander for Test and Evalua-
tion. The President of BIS is located in Washington, D. C.
and has Sub-Boards of Inspection and Survey located in Virginia,
California, and Maryland. The Sub-BIS for aircraft is located
at Patuxent River, Maryland. It tasks, for example, the Naval
Air Test Center to conduct technical tests of production air-
craft weapon systems or follow on tests on significant changes
to aircraft in use. Based on the test results the President
of BIS recommends to the Secretary of the Navy whether the
aircraft weapon system should be accepted for fleet use.
The potential conflict or duplication of the BIS and
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COMOPTEVFOR roles have been actively discussed and analyzed
recently. The Navy expressed confirmation of the need for
each organizations' function, role and contribution to the
T&E process through the recent revision of OPNAVINST 3960. lOA
[Ref. 23].
The AIR-0 6 organization evolved from the need to
provide a focal point for NAVAIRSYSCOM RDT&E resources. AIR-06
coordinates the Navy's Major Range and Test Facility Base
(MRFTB) with DDT&E. Since the TEMP has become a key document
for major weapon systems, AIR-06 has taken responsibility for
coordinating the DT&E and OT&E requirements for the program
manager. AIR-06 also coordinates the workload going to the
NAVAIR field activities with the resources required to conduct
DT&E. The effectiveness of this organization in performing
its mission has not been confirmed since its establishment in
1975.
F. EVOLUTION
There is presently a significant variance between the Navy
approach to T&E and those of the Air Force and Army. In the
1970' s the decision making processes for major acquisition of
weapon systems has varied from decentralization to the Services
and then a return to centralization at the Office of the
Secretary of Defense. Presently, the trend is toward account-
ability and decentralization to the Services as outlined in a
recent Deputy Secretary of Defense memo [Ref. 24] . Consequently,
33

high visibility issues, such as, productivity improvement by
increasing DOD effectiveness and efficiency through reduction
in duplication of Service efforts will require more cooperation
between the Services and more joint Service acquisition programs.
This will magnify the differences in the Services' approaches
to T&E and result in a buildup of forces toward more continuity
in test techniques, methodologies, test personnel qualifications,
and analytical techniques. The pressure by DOD for hard
operational test data will increase. This will force the Navy
to make substantial compromises in its past policies on indep-
endent operational testing and its need for more analysis in
the evaluation phase. The Services will approach a common
TScE base to allow DOD to make rapid management decisions to
reduce the length of the acquisition cycle. DDT&E's future
role is unclear in the present move toward decentralization.
Since at present DDT&E operates primarily in a persuasive
mode with the Services, increased joint Service programs
might necessitate more authority for the DDT&E. A Defense





The need for full-time, fully-funded graduate education
for DOD personnel has received considerable attention in the
1970 's. The declining enrollments in higher education has
accelerated the availability of graduate education at DOD
facilities as colleges and universities have competed for
this source of revenues. Advances in technology and
society's acceptance of the value of education has increased
this need for continuing education by the work force. Most
who seek advanced education do so to receive a graduate degree,
Military positions have been established requiring advanced
degrees to perform the duties of the job. This frequently
has been done to enhance retention, increase the morale of
the personnel and provide for increased job opportunities
after retirement. On the civilian side, the bureacracy has
used advanced degrees as a screening mechanism in selection
for promotion and to increase the technical status of the
organization.
Before most personnel make a commitment to long term
training one of their chief concerns is whether the award
of a graduate degree can be achieved. Since advanced degrees
are becoming a norm in our society, it is unlikely there will
be many participants in a full-time advanced education program
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just for the benefit of the additional training. The selec-
tion of civilians for long-term fully-funded training, as a
recognition for having high-potential to be future hign-level
leaders within DOD
,
places additional pressure on the recipient
to earn an advanced degree. The sponsoring activities also
subtly encourage that the advanced degree is an expected
result of the trainee's efforts. The T&E activities, priir.arily
those involved in development testing and evaluation, have
long recognized and voiced the need for graduate education in
support of the T&E process. The engineering schools have
been reluctant to offer off-campus programs which lead to
advanced degrees mainly for traditional and quality of gradu-
ate education reasons. Most T&E activities are in remote
locations and provide a small market. This does not motivate
the engineering schools to be flexible in their attitudes
toward serving the needs of the T&E community. An MIT study
found there was little research available to evaluate the
performance of engineering schools in meeting the education
needs of their graduates [Ref . 25] . Most engineering schools
have been too preoccuppied with spending Federal research
dollars or graduating students to meet industry's requirements.
They have consequently failed to solicit graduate feedback.
The Accrediting Board for Engineering and Technology, in
order to prevent stagnation in engineering education, does
not advocate rigid standards for accreditation and encourages




The literature reviews cited in the Introduction proposed
programs for graduate education in T&E. The Pacific Missile
Test Center, a Navy T&E field activity, located at Point
Mugu, California has also proposed some innovative programs
to provide graduate education to its technical employees.
The Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in Monterey, California
has two courses listed in its catalog which are titled Test
and Evaluation which are taught by the Operations Research
Department. In the past, informal discussions with Navy
field activities' personnel have resulted in NPS spokesmen
proposing "strawmen" T&E curricula. These proposals have
not moved forward due to lack of Department of the Navy
support and current constraints on NPS resources. The Naval
Aviation Executive Institute Program was established at Naval
Missile Test Center, Point Mugu, California in 1975 and
moved to the NPS in 1976. This program has high potential
to respond to the graduate education needs of the Navy's
T&E community and could provide a model for the rest of the
T&E community.
Some observations are presented on the status of T&E
engineering as a profession. The parameters which have
been identified that pertain to T&E of aircraft weapon
systems but are relevant to the T&E of other weapon systems
and equipment are discussed. The needs of different levels
of personnel in the Navy T&E community are reviewed and






The atmosphere for full-time, fully-funded graduate
education in the DOD, has not been very favorable. The NPS
which in the eary 1970 "s had an enrollment of 1200 Navy
students has had its budget cut by Congress to where the NPS
had 400 students in FY 1977. This figure has increased to
600 Navy students for FY 81 and the Congressional committees
are in support of this level. The Navy and Air Force have
been critized for the cost per student to provide postgraduate
education for their personnel compared with the cost per
student of using non-military institutions. The Navy has
been the smallest user of public sector colleges and universi-
ties to provide full-time, fully- funded education. The Air
Force, although it supports the Air Force Institute of
Technology (AFIT) , sends a majority of its full time graduate
students to the public sector institutions. The Army sends
most of its full time students to the public sector institu-
tions except for those it sends to NPS and AFIT.
The GAO [Ref. 27] addressed the permissive attitude of
the services toward full-time, fully-funded graduate educa-
tion for officers. The services were tasked to validate
positions requiring advanced education in order to perform
the duties of the position. These were primarily positions
in the science and technology areas. The intent of providing
the postgraduate education was to prepare officers to function
more effectively in these positions. The GAO report took
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issue with the long education periods, some extending to 3
years. Also the GAO noted that equivalent positions in the
Services were judged inconsistently regarding the need for
graduate education. Some positions required advanced educa-
tion and others did not. Positions were validated as requir-
ing advanced education only because the officer in the
position had an advanced degree. Official job descriptions
requiring advanced degrees were submitted for validation
which did not address the requirement for graduate education
in the job descriptions. The GAO found from its sample audit
of military installations that officers with graduate educat-
ion were not being assigned to the positions which required
graduate education.
The GAO recommended that the Services use short courses
and work experience as alternatives to full-time graduate
education. Also they should fill the positions with civil-
ians where possible. DOD was requested to issue a new policy
restricting the number of positions requiring a graduate
education. Congress was requested to control the number of
military officers in full-time, fully- funded graduate study
by limiting the funds available.
DOD had encouraged the graduate education of military
officers. In our society there are generally accepted values
and benefits of graduate education. DOD felt that the
graduate education enhanced the effectiveness and capability




The GAO considered the effectiveness of long-term,
full-time graduate education for DOD civilians in non-
government institutions [Ref . 28] . Long term training was
considered training greater than 120 days. The training
was through courses at the graduate level primarily in
management, scientific, engineering, or technical fields.
The DOD installations were critized because they did
not follow existing regulations. The field activities had
not determined what their near and long term (5 year) train-
ing needs were nor had they prioritized them. The GAO
found little evidence that there was a plan to use the new
skills of the employee upon return from long-term training.
In addition, the field activities had: a) not given much
thought to selecting employees for training in areas where
there was the greatest need; (b) overemphasized the require-
ment to obtain an academic degree; (c) not used any criteria
for selecting non-government schools; and (d) not provided
for any evaluation of the training to determine if its
objectives were met.
The objectives of DOD's support of long-term, full-time
training and education for civilian employees are as follows
(a) to maintain a position of leadership in defense-oriented
science and technology; (b) to provide opportunities for
career employees of promise to grow and realize their full
potential; and Cc) to better enable employees to success-
fully cope with the complex problems of managing all aspects
of national defense activities.
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The Civil Service Commission, DOD, and the Service's
regulations emphasize that training qualify personnel for
performance of official duties. The accomplishment of an
advanced degree should be an incidental by-product of the
training. The GAO found, however, the field activities'
applications for long-term training implied that the indivi-
dual was expected to achieve an advanced degree. Training
programs were frequently structured so that they lead to an
advanced degree, hence improving the prestige and image of
the activity. Additionally, GAO found that the individuals
applying for long-term training did so out of self-interest
and their self-development did not support the training
objective of the activity. The individuals selected their
own course of study and selected the training institution.
The National Academy of Public Administration conducted a
study on military officer graduate education in 1975 [Ref
.
29] . This was just prior to congressional action on an 0MB
recommended 70 per cent reduction in funding for full-time,
fully-funded graduate education. The panel concurred that
the military should have educational background comparable
with their counterparts in the private sector and government.
The existing system of counting positions requiring gradu-
ate education, however, should be replaced with one that sets
educational standards and integrates the need with technical,
organizational, and strategic plans. It recommended the
Services utilize other programs such as off-duty, recruitment
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Lof officers with advanced degrees — especially in fields with
shortages — and cooperative study (flexibility for officers
to take courses during normal working hours) . The Navy and
Air Force postgraduate schools were encouraged to increase
their number of off-campus personal study courses so as to
reduce the time in residency to complete graduate programs
.
In order to accomplish more off-campus education with high
standards and quality, representatives of the Services and
higher education should establish ground rules for instructor
selection and credit transfer. The report emphasized the
need for classroom situations with both civilian and military
participation in the learning process.
The report noted that the need for graduate education is
obvious in the physical, mathmatical, and engineering sciences.
These disciplines are used in the development and operation
of high technology weapons, transportation, and communication
systems. In addition, advanced education is necessary in
biological, social, operational, and managerial services in
order to manage, deploy, and operate these systems. Although
the Services depend on civilian industry to provide the
talent to produce the weapons they need, an officer corp less
educated than its counterparts will be severly handicapped in
its relations with civilians.
In a situation of reduced funding, technical advanced
education is the beneficiary of a majority of the funds for
full-time, fully-funded education. It is nearly impossible
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for an officer to acquire an advanced degree in engineering
or science through an off-duty or a partially-funded program;
and it is easier to couple specific technical and science
degrees with validated billets.
C. AFTER WORKING HOURS
The proliferation of after hours graduate programs has
raised questions about the quality of these programs. Most
installations have taken the view that having some graduate
program offerings is better than nothing. These programs
stretch out for several years and have high student drop-
out rates. A majority of the programs are management vice
technical oriented because most engineering schools have
been reluctant to offer complete off-campus graduate
programs
.
There are some limitations to graduate education conducted
under these conditions. Most employees/students are at a low
point in their learning capacity and retention capability
after a day's work. The employee's class attendance is
frequently interrupted by work-related travel or problems.
The classes consist primarily of work associates; therefore,
there is not the opportunity to experience the multiple
viewpoints occurring in the campus environment. Specific
programs are difficult to sustain due to employee turnover,
lack of recognition of credit for the courses by other higher
education institutions, changes in the individual's education
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goals, and declining interest in the specific programs
offered.
The issue of "cheap degrees" offered at military bases
was addressed by Gene Sherron, an American Council on
Education Fellow [Ref. 30]. He indicates that most of the
programs are so poor that these programs would be classed
as diploma mills if given close scrutiny by the educational
community. At least 19 colleges and universities from as
far away as California offer graduate degree programs in
Washington, D.C. Some major institutions refuse to partici-
pate because it is their position that quality graduate
education belongs on campus where students have access to
full time professors and research facilities.
So far the accrediting bodies and associations of higher
education have not forced a policing or correction in the
proliferation of advanced degrees around the nation. The
declining enrollments and reduced college budgets have
accelerated many institutions' quest for the available
education dollars in the after-work-hours market. The DOD
is partially to blame for allowing these institutions to
offer their educational wares at military installations
without any control of quality or admissions criteria. The
local government administrator normally does not have an
advanced degree and is under intense pressure to keep
enrollments up and expenses down. Most programs use
part-time instructors recruited locally.
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D. THE CURRICULUM PROPOSALS
1- Naval Postgraduate School Informal Proposals
In the past seven years the NPS faculty have held
informal discussions with T&E field activity representatives
regarding the design of a T&E curriculum. Although it would
be desireable to have a six quarter program, field activity
management is strongly opposed to providing full-time
training for more than one year. The military probably
would not have difficulty with this point, since most of the
sponsored NPS curricula are six quarters and longer.
Table I summarizes informal NPS past proposals for a T&E
curriculum. These proposals have a high probability and statis-
tics content and a strong operations research orientation.
The thesis requirement creates a heavy workload for the
four quarter curriculum. Since the students most probably
will have written technical reports prior to attending the
NPS and will write technical reports upon return to their
work place, the thesis requirement could be waived without
reducing the quality of the graduate education. The NPS
retains the control of the quality of the graduate education
via having the student in full time residence at NPS; and
the test activity would reinforce the quality of the educa-
tional experience through ensuring that the graduate has the
opportunity to write a formal technical report upon
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The NPS "strawman" curricula are informal proposals and
do not really address responsibility for the program. In
order to ensure that there is a linking of engineering,
management, and operations research disciplines, some
thought should be given by the NPS administration to consider-
ing this curriculum as a Masters of Science in Engineering-
Management degree program. Although there appears to be
adequate field activity interest in a T&E oriented curriculum
at NPS, it has not happended for numerous reasons. Among
these is a lack of high level Department of the Navy interest
in a T&E program and the availability of the resources
required by NPS to implement the program.
2 . Pacific Missile Test Center
The Pacific Missile Test Center (PMTC) Point Mugu,
California has advocated the establishment of an advanced
degree in T&E since the mid 1970 's. In 1974 it was able to
establish an innovative, off-campus graduate education pro-
gram in engineering with the cooperation of the California
State University, Northridge [Ref. 31,32]. This program.
Technical Professional Program, was developed around the new
engineering graduate employeed by PMTC.
The objectives were to prepare the engineer for roles
as a technical specialist in T&E and to develop the engineer's
skill and competence to plan and analyze large scale tests.
The students attended classes half-time and worked half-time.
They were expected to complete the program in one calendar
year. The work projects were designed to support the
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classroom studies. Certainly, this was a bold attempt to
bring graduate education into the real world to support the
needs of the practioner. Some of the weak points of this
program appear to be the employee counselor, and a work
dossier which was maintained by the student and graded as
satisfying course requirements. This program placed much
responsibility on the PMTC employees to act as pseudo-
educators and to ensure that the students had project exper-
ience equivalent to an on-campus graduate level learning
situation. The Technical Professional Program was conducted
for one year ending in 1976.
The PMTC has drawn from the experience gained from the
Technical Professional Program and has proposed the Test and
Evaluation Intern Program [Ref , 33] . This is a two year
program designed to develop a T&E Professional Engineer.
Academic instruction is provided by California State
University, Northridge and University of California, Santa
Barbara. The program participants would spend the six
semesters of the program at various test sites performing
assignments in T&E of components, subsystems, and systems.
Formal course work would be attended during part of the
work day. The courses are listed in Table II. This
program requires substantial support from the Navy T&E
community to progress. It is a commendable effort because
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Program, requires close working cooperation between the
educational institution, the student, and the participating
T&E activity to enrich the learning experience of graduate
education.
E. CHARACTERISTICS OF PROFESSIONS
DOD high level officials have been reluctant to acknow-
ledge the existence of T&E as being a distinct technical
discipline. This is understandable because most DOD personnel
are not familiar with the T&E process and its role in the
acquisition of weapon systems. The President's Blue Ribbon
Panel Report on OT&E supports this observation [Ref . 34]
.
Government personnel, primarily in the development test
activities, have been the primary spokesmen for calling
attention to the evolution of a T&E engineering discipline.
Although they have asked academia to develop formal courses
and curriculum to support their needs, engineering institutions
have paid little attention to the requests of the T&E community
A review of the characteristics of professions is in order to
help explain the lack of recognition of T&E as an engineering
discipline.
The difference between occupations and professions can be
viewed as a continuum. The occupations, such as carpentry and
brick- laying, are on the lower end and medicine and law on the
upper end of the continuum. A number of attributes have been
defined which are normally associated with a profession
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[Ref. 35]. These are: (1) a systematic body of theory; (2)
professional authority; (3) sanctions by the community; (4)
a regulative code of ethics; and (5) a professional culture.
The U. S. Census Bureau in its occupational classification
includes engineers in the professional category. Again, look-
ing at the continuum of professions, the engineering profes-
sion would be considered below the law and medical professions.
The environment in which most engineers work differs from
other professionals [Ref. 25]. The T&E engineers, for example,
differ as follows: (1) they do not choose their clients; (2)
they do not have on the job autonomy; (3) they do not have to
obtain a recognized postgraduate educational certification;
and (5) they do not have a strong, professionally-backed set
of standards and ethics.
The profession which has really arrived is noted by certain
characteristics which enables it to exercise social control
over its community. What evolves then is the professional
community within the larger social community [Ref. 35]. The
professional community members tend to take on the following
characteristics: (1) bound by sense of identity; (2) once in
the profession, continue for their whole career; (3) share
values in common; (4) role definitions which are agreed to by
both members and non-members; and (5) take on a common language
which is only partially understood by non-members. In addition
the community has power over its members; its imposed social
limits are reasonably clear; and it controls the composition
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of the community in the future through selection of profes-
sional trainees and the training processes. The T&E communi-
ty has not demonstrated that it has moved to the point where
it exhibits any of these characteristics.
The knowledge explosion has created specialization within
the professions. Technology appears to be increasing almost
exponentially creating a broad technical base and many combina-
tions of knowledge. Professional specialization is partly
responsible for creating the technology expansion which in
turn has increased the amount of specialization. The
specialist, for example the electronics engineer, may become
obsolete because his specialty may still change too fast for
an individual to keep current. His specialty might be super-
seded by advances in knowledge that make his knowledge or
skill unnecessary or inadequate. To an increasing degree a
professional career must be regarded as a continuous learning
experience. The call by the DOD T&E community, for recogni-
tion as a unique engineering specialty, is an expression of
this phenomenon.
F. FOCAL POINT FOR T&E EDUCATION?
The DOD sponsors the Defense Systems Management College
(DSMC) , Fort Belvoir, Virginia to train prospective program
managers. The DSMC primarily provides training to military
and civilian employees of the DOD who will be employed in the
acquisition of weapon systems. There is also limited participa-
tion by contractors. The DSMC, therefore, has become a focal
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point for the discussion, disemmination, and training in
program management principles. Problems with the DOD acquisi-
tion cycle are aired here and possible solutions are discussed
in a classroom environment. Students are instructed in
problems and future trends in program management.
High level DOD management officials participate in DSMC
sponsored programs and publications. Thus, through this
focal point improvements in DOD management techniques can be
proposed, assessed, and discussed openly. The resulting
benefits to DOD, by providing program management training to
military, civilian and contractor personnel are: (1) provides
a common ground to communicate the DOD policy on acquisition
management techniques; (2) prepares high level military and
civilian personnel who will be assigned to program offices
for the rigors of program management; (3) introduces these
personnel to the political aspects of the acquisition of
weapon systems; and (4) sharing of lessons learned from case
studies of previous acquisition programs.
The T&E community has no counterpart to the DSMC. T&E
has not been institutionalized in DOD. There is no recognized
focal point in the T&E community where the Services can
exchange lessons learned, share methodologies and techniques,
build a knowledge base, disseminate information, conduct
research, and encourage cooperation. With minimal interference
from DOD each of the Services have developed separate approach-
es to T&E. The Joint Logistics Commanders work to improve
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the participation of each of the Services in joint service
acquisition programs. Ad hoc working groups are formed to
study specific problems and to improve the conduct of joint
Service programs. The Range Commanders Council, chaired by
the Director of Defense T&E, occasionally sponsors ad hoc
working groups to address T&E issues. Only the T&E activities
designated as part of the Major Range and Test Facility Base
(MRTFB) participate in this forum. They are listed in
Appendix A, Table I.
The DOD through the DDT&E should sponsor a study or task
the Services to compile the available knowledge on T&E. It
should inventory the military and civilian skills required to
conduct T&E.
G. TAILORING T&E EDUCATION
There is increasing evidence that greater cooperation
between academic institutions and the worksite for graduate
education can enrich the learning experience for all the
participants [Refs. 33,37]. Academia receives immediate feed-
back for an evaluation of the curriculum and the needs of the
student relative to the marketplace. The T&E education needs
are a variable as shown in Figure 1. The more senior the
DOD official involved in T&E the less are his T&E education
requirements; and, therefore, T&E seminars of a few days would
be appropriate.
The new engineer graduates have been high in analytical
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T&E experience is gained through assisting more experienced
engineers. Through a combination of employer needs and the
engineer's interests a degree of specialization evolves. The
engineer, for example, after involvement in several test
projects with a given type aircraft to determine its per-
formance characteristics, may become aligned with one
specialty of aerodynamics. He will then pursue technical
updating in expectation of receiving a graduate degree. Most
data shows engineers to be stable and 90% are expected to
remain in their field for five years after graduation [Ref.
25]
.
Provided the engineer stays at a DOD T&E activity, he
will observe that more of his time is occupied with manage-
ment related matters. This situation also begins to surface
the deficiencies in the engineering education for dealing
with the social and human problems which are more difficult
to bound than analytical problems. At this point a decision
is required on pursuing technical management. Leaving the
T&E activity, pursuing a technical specialist career or
developing managerial skills are the main options available.
Some T&E activities have been more successful than others in
developing a dual career advancement program; however, this
still remains a critical decision point for most engineers.
The evolution of education needs as shown in Figure 1 gives
evidence of the need for flexibility in the concept of T&E
education. The needs of the specific T&E activity should be
matched with the needs of the individual to perform his duties.
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It is at this point T&E education can have a recognizeable
form. The types of education which are shown in Figure 2
depict in general the needs of T&E personnel. The point at
which these education needs change are peculiar to each
individual and T&E activity. It does provide, however, an
indication of the range of education required. The technical
report writing and test planning need to be reinforced and
integrated into the specific technical education courses.
The repetition and reinforcement of these basic skills are
critical in communicating T&E results concisely.
In the case of the military officer entering T&E of air-
craft weapons systems a different education evolution occurs.
The operating skills of the officer are used to support the
T&E process. For example, it depends on which T&E activity
he is assigned to as to whether or not he will receive
specific training at the Naval Test Pilot School. This
training develops the skills to conduct engineering flight
testing. The military officer T&E education needs are
normally different than those for the engineer. He may only
spend two years in T&E and is more concerned with operating
skills and management education. He may have already attended
the Naval Postgraduate School and received graduate education
in engineering prior to coming to the T&E activity. The
officer who has a designated subspecialty as an aviation
engineering duty officer normally has an advanced technical
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Ineeds would lie more to the right in Figures 1 and 2. If a
T&E curriculum were available, for example at the NPS, then
the officers completing the curriculum would be more effec-
tive at their jobs sooner and require less on-the-job train-
ing time. The officers interviewed in reference [2] indicated
that knowledge about T&E principles and program management
would have helped their effectiveness in their jobs and
reduced their on-the-job training.
The need for T&E education so far has come from the
personnel assigned to the T&E activities. The T&E body of
knowledge is disbursed throughout the DOD T&E activities.
The Director of Defense T&E (DDT&E) support is needed for the
support of the activities' efforts to define their graduate
education requirements. DDT&E could contract for a study
with industry, a nongovernment academic institution, or a
military postgraduate school on the issues involving T&E
education. Some of the parameters this study could consider
are: (1) the bounds and content of the T&E body of knowledge;
(2) a focal point for T&E knowledge; (3) T&E education; (4)
military careers in T&E; (5) future trends in T&E; and (6)
rotation of civilian and military personnel between T&E
activities
.
The Congress has not always been pleased with the Services'
management of T&E. Congress would be supportive of DDT&E
efforts to exercise management improvement of the T&E process.
Congress has expressed concerns in the past that the Service
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filter T&E results of major weapon systems in order to enhance
the chances Congress will provide funding for procurement.
Various studies have critisized the delays, duplications, and
cost of T&E. These are symptoms which have been treated by
numerous directives and instructions and even establishment
of the DDT&E. Possibly, through T&E education, developing a
body of T&E knowledge, and establishing a DOD focal point for
distribution of this knowledge the significance and role of
T&E can be fairly assessed.
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IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
1. General
The hypothesis is not presently supportable. There
is little evidence to justify the establishment of a graduate
TStE curriculum. There is a real need, however, for a compila-
tion of the information available on T&E in the DOD. It is
the DDT&E responsibility to define, support, and initiate
this effort.
2. Specific
The DOD officials, in attempting to solve the problems
of the acquisition of major weapon systems, identified weak-
nesses in the role of T&E. The solutions have been to change
organizational structure and to change the timing and participa-
tion of T&E personnel in the acquisition cycle. The problems
in T&E, however, seem more fundamental. The area of T&E
education has not been considered by high level DOD officials
as relevant to improving the effectiveness of T&E,
The Services have developed different implementations
of the concept of independent testing as required by DOD
directives. These differences raise policy, procedural and
philosophical issues, when the Services are required to par-
ticipate in joint-service acquisition programs. The same sort
of situation also exists in combined intra-Service testing.
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The trend for the future, in order to decrease duplication
of efforts and acquisition costs and schedules, is to increase
the number of joint-Service programs and of intra-Service
combined tests. This points to a need for increased high
level DOD officials' attention to the education and training
needs of T&E personnel to reduce communication problems.
It is not generally accepted or recognized by high
level DOD officials that TSeE requires unique education. T&E
in support of the acquisition cycle is, however, unique to
DOD. The body of knowledge, professional society representa-
tion, and community characteristics do not exist in a highly
visible form. The DOD T&E community is not well organized
or well represented. There is no consensus on what a T&E
specialist is. Most engineers and officers would not, if
asked, claim to be a T&E specialist but would instead identify
with the engineering discipline in which they earned their
degree, for example electrical engineering.
Academic institutions have not generally embraced the
concept of T&E as a specialty. There has been little academic
interest in establishing T&E courses or developing faculty to
support a T&E curriculum. The educational parameters necessary
to support T&E seem to point more toward a blend of engineering
and management education.
The T&E personnel are not very mobile. There has been
very little effort in DOD to utilize T&E personnel across
Service lines or intra-Service between test agencies. The
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opportunities, therefore, for cross-pollenization of T&E
skills, policies, test methods and lessons learned have been
minimal. Government personnel policies do not provide for
the transfer of T&E personnel to programs where their talents
are most needed. The evolution and identity of the T&E
Specialists with special education requirements can only be
impeded by this policy.
The Naval Aviation Executive Institute (NAEI) program
in cooperation with the Naval Postgraduate School could be
the leader in the DOD for defining and supporting the graduate
education needs of T&E personnel. Increased cooperation and
flexibility are required between the NAEI, NPS, and the Navy's
T&E agencies. The uncertainties, of future civilian T&E
personnel participation in NPS provided education, could be
resolved through improved communications of the needs of each
of the participating organizations.
B . RECOMMENDAT IONS
1. The Director Defense T&E (DDT&E)
The DDT&E should:
(1) establish a focal point for the compilation and
dissemination of T&E information.
(2) initiate a study to define the DOD T&E body of
knowledge.
C3) sponsor an annual seminar on DOD T&E.
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(4) develop a seminar course consisting of 20-40 hours
of instruction on DOD T&E for high level DOD
officials
.
(5) assess the T&E related education needs of the
T&E agencies and prepare a plan to support these
needs.
2. The Services
Each of the Services should;
(1) compile its existing body of T&E knowledge.
(2) review the educational needs of its T&E personnel.
(3) define career paths for T&E personnel which includes
involvement in acquisition management decision
making.
3. NFS, NAEI, and the Navy's RDT&E Agencies
Representatives from these activities should meet to
review the trends in graduate education, and the need to
involve the NFS more closely in the integration of education
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